Recent Blog Posts
-
The Times' Rorshach Geithner Story
Apr 27 20099:26 am EDT -
Sinking Animal Spirits
Apr 27 20098:45 am EDT -
Counter-cyclical Urban Policy
Apr 26 200910:00 am EDT -
Be Your Own Counterfeiter
Apr 26 20099:36 am EDT -
Being Tim Geithner
Apr 25 200912:37 pm EDT -
Notes From a Press Conference Naif
Apr 25 20099:41 am EDT -
What Good is the News?
Apr 25 20098:32 am EDT -
Stressful Enough
Apr 24 20092:29 pm EDT -
Not Regretting the Pound
Apr 24 20091:09 pm EDT -
Introducing the New Ford Squeeze
Apr 24 20099:47 am EDT
Links
- Felix Salmon

- DealBreaker

- Ryan Avent: The Bellows

- The Epicurean Dealmaker

- Chris Anderson

- Ultimi Barbarorum

- MarketBeat

- Michelle Leder

- John Quiggin

- The Panelist

- Andrew Leonard

- Streetsblog

- Brad Setser

- Michael Mandel

- Financial Crookery

- Kash Mansori

- Dean Baker

- Calculated Risk

- Free Exchange

- Curbed

- Lance Knobel

- Econospeak

- Carbon Tax Center

- Overcoming Bias

- Mark Thoma

- Naked Capitalism

- Alphaville

- Barry Ritholtz

- Alexander Campbell

- The Bayesian Heresy

- Brad DeLong

- DealBook

- Greg Mankiw

- Deal Journal

- FP Passport

- Carl Bialik

- Marginal Revolution

- A Fistful of Euros

- Dan Gross

Defragging the CDS Market
You know when you've had a computer for a long time, and the hard drive is full of crap, and some tech wizard comes up with a way of defragging it or something, and the idea is that suddenly it'll be much leaner and cleaner and faster? Well, the CDS market is a bit like that hard drive, it would seem, and two firms in the CDS arena, Markit and Creditex, are the tech wizards who have a bright plan to come in and clean it up.
The new compression approach improves on previous tear-up processes by delivering significantly better compression results while leaving market risk profiles unchanged. The process involves terminating existing trades and replacing them with a far fewer number of new "replacement trades" which have the same risk profile and cash flows as the initial portfolio, but with less capital exposure.
The idea is to reduce the nominal amount of CDS outstanding - currently $62 trillion or something equally impossible to grasp - by tearing up trades which offset one another and generally reducing the market to the smallest possible number of contracts on any given name. Counterparty risk won't be reduced a lot, but documentation risk will be. Consider for instance an anecdote in today's FT:
In one case the seller of credit protection recently discovered that the final agreement on insuring a portfolio of collateralised debt obligations had never been signed, either by it or a French bank which in this case was buying protection. Now, with the meltdown in that market, the seller has returned all the premium payments to the buyer and torn up the agreement, saying that because it was never signed, it has no legal obligation to pay up.
I wish that Henny Sender had more details here on both the buyer and the seller of protection; if I were the French bank in question, I wouldn't have too much compunction about outing the culprit. But this kind of thing is clearly a risk to the CDS market, and if hastily-drawn-up contracts get torn up as part of the new scheme, that would be an excellent outcome.
The question of course is whether this is all too little too late. The tear-up process won't even start until Q3, and even then will only be active on the minority of CDS contracts which are written on single names. The really hairy ones - the ones written on baskets and CDOs and other such creatures - won't be touched. That's a careful and responsible way of doing things. But it might need to be accelerated if things start getting really messy.
Comments
If you are commenting using a Facebook account, your profile information may be displayed with your comment depending on your privacy settings. By leaving the 'Post to Facebook' box selected, your comment will be published to your Facebook profile in addition to the space below.





