Recent Blog Posts
-
The Times' Rorshach Geithner Story
Apr 27 20099:04am EDT -
Sinking Animal Spirits
Apr 27 20098:04am EDT -
Counter-cyclical Urban Policy
Apr 26 200910:04am EDT -
Be Your Own Counterfeiter
Apr 26 20099:04am EDT -
Being Tim Geithner
Apr 25 200912:04pm EDT -
Notes From a Press Conference Naif
Apr 25 20099:04am EDT -
What Good is the News?
Apr 25 20098:04am EDT -
Stressful Enough
Apr 24 20092:04pm EDT -
Not Regretting the Pound
Apr 24 20091:04pm EDT -
Introducing the New Ford Squeeze
Apr 24 20099:04am EDT -
Non-Economic Questions of the Day
Apr 24 20099:04am EDT -
The Stress Test Blind Alley
Apr 24 20098:04am EDT -
Happy Hour
Apr 23 20099:04pm EDT -
Recovery Without Rebalancing
Apr 23 20096:04pm EDT -
The Shape of Your Recession
Apr 23 20095:04pm EDT
Links
- Felix Salmon

- DealBreaker

- Ryan Avent: The Bellows

- The Epicurean Dealmaker

- Chris Anderson

- Ultimi Barbarorum

- MarketBeat

- Michelle Leder

- John Quiggin

- The Panelist

- Andrew Leonard

- Streetsblog

- Brad Setser

- Michael Mandel

- Financial Crookery

- Kash Mansori

- Dean Baker

- Calculated Risk

- Free Exchange

- Curbed

- Lance Knobel

- Econospeak

- Carbon Tax Center

- Overcoming Bias

- Mark Thoma

- Naked Capitalism

- Alphaville

- Barry Ritholtz

- Alexander Campbell

- The Bayesian Heresy

- Brad DeLong

- DealBook

- Greg Mankiw

- Deal Journal

- FP Passport

- Carl Bialik

- Marginal Revolution

- A Fistful of Euros

- Dan Gross

Heloc Securitization Datapoint of the Day
The biggest losses in the mortgage world have generally been taken on second liens - what in the real world are generally known as home equity lines. If you have a mortgage and a home equity line, and you default on your underwater mortgage, then the chances of the home equity lender getting anything at all are slim indeed.
So it's not uncommon for bonds backed by home-equity lines to have recovery rates of zero when there is a default. But in one case, a bond known as Bear Stearns 2007-01, closed in April 2007, it's not just the recovery rates which are dreadful, it's the default rates, too. According to an Ambac presentation (Ambac was an insurer on the bond) losses have already reached 9.9%, which is pretty bad. But just look at projected losses, over the life of the bond: 81.8%!
As David Wallis, Ambac's chief risk officer, explains, this means that 81 of every 100 borrowers in that pool will simply walk away from their loans. Which, he says, "sounds pretty bad to me". And that's assuming a sharp drop-off in default rates going forwards:

On the other hand, notes Wallis, you have to assume a sharp drop-off in default rates going forward:
It is true, it is a fairly sharp diminution. However, it has to be because if it is not, you end up with more than 100% of collateral loss, which does not make any sense either.
Here we have asset-backed bonds which are essentially backed by no assets. Remember that the whole point of an asset-backed bond is that you don't need to worry so much about credit risk, because you've always got collateral. Oops.






