Recent Blog Posts
-
The Times' Rorshach Geithner Story
Apr 27 20099:04am EDT -
Sinking Animal Spirits
Apr 27 20098:04am EDT -
Counter-cyclical Urban Policy
Apr 26 200910:04am EDT -
Be Your Own Counterfeiter
Apr 26 20099:04am EDT -
Being Tim Geithner
Apr 25 200912:04pm EDT -
Notes From a Press Conference Naif
Apr 25 20099:04am EDT -
What Good is the News?
Apr 25 20098:04am EDT -
Stressful Enough
Apr 24 20092:04pm EDT -
Not Regretting the Pound
Apr 24 20091:04pm EDT -
Introducing the New Ford Squeeze
Apr 24 20099:04am EDT -
Non-Economic Questions of the Day
Apr 24 20099:04am EDT -
The Stress Test Blind Alley
Apr 24 20098:04am EDT -
Happy Hour
Apr 23 20099:04pm EDT -
Recovery Without Rebalancing
Apr 23 20096:04pm EDT -
The Shape of Your Recession
Apr 23 20095:04pm EDT
Links
- Felix Salmon

- DealBreaker

- Ryan Avent: The Bellows

- The Epicurean Dealmaker

- Chris Anderson

- Ultimi Barbarorum

- MarketBeat

- Michelle Leder

- John Quiggin

- The Panelist

- Andrew Leonard

- Streetsblog

- Brad Setser

- Michael Mandel

- Financial Crookery

- Kash Mansori

- Dean Baker

- Calculated Risk

- Free Exchange

- Curbed

- Lance Knobel

- Econospeak

- Carbon Tax Center

- Overcoming Bias

- Mark Thoma

- Naked Capitalism

- Alphaville

- Barry Ritholtz

- Alexander Campbell

- The Bayesian Heresy

- Brad DeLong

- DealBook

- Greg Mankiw

- Deal Journal

- FP Passport

- Carl Bialik

- Marginal Revolution

- A Fistful of Euros

- Dan Gross

Carlyle Deserved to Collapse
Should Carlyle Capital be aggrieved that its lenders are seizing its assets? There is a case to be made - and it's made quite well by Robert Peston - that this is all the fault of the Fed and its new TSLF facility. Rather than dump Carlyle's assets, the banks can use them as collateral at the Fed's new window, and get lovely liquid Treasury bonds in exchange: something Carlyle can't do itself.
So maybe Carlyle got unlucky, in that it might have been able to negotiate something with its lenders had the TSLF window not been in existence. On the other hand, Carlyle was clearly the architect of its own unluck, as would be any insolvent fund with 32x leverage. No one has any business taking on that kind of leverage in this kind of market, and efficient markets demand that when such outsize bets sour, the bettor collapses.
In any case, Carlyle is now in default on $16.6 billion in obligations: that's a huge default, even if recovery value is going to be very high indeed. And it's yet another striking datapoint for whomever is going to write the history of this credit crisis.






