Recent Blog Posts
-
The Times' Rorshach Geithner Story
Apr 27 20099:04am EDT -
Sinking Animal Spirits
Apr 27 20098:04am EDT -
Counter-cyclical Urban Policy
Apr 26 200910:04am EDT -
Be Your Own Counterfeiter
Apr 26 20099:04am EDT -
Being Tim Geithner
Apr 25 200912:04pm EDT -
Notes From a Press Conference Naif
Apr 25 20099:04am EDT -
What Good is the News?
Apr 25 20098:04am EDT -
Stressful Enough
Apr 24 20092:04pm EDT -
Not Regretting the Pound
Apr 24 20091:04pm EDT -
Introducing the New Ford Squeeze
Apr 24 20099:04am EDT -
Non-Economic Questions of the Day
Apr 24 20099:04am EDT -
The Stress Test Blind Alley
Apr 24 20098:04am EDT -
Happy Hour
Apr 23 20099:04pm EDT -
Recovery Without Rebalancing
Apr 23 20096:04pm EDT -
The Shape of Your Recession
Apr 23 20095:04pm EDT
Links
- Felix Salmon

- DealBreaker

- Ryan Avent: The Bellows

- The Epicurean Dealmaker

- Chris Anderson

- Ultimi Barbarorum

- MarketBeat

- Michelle Leder

- John Quiggin

- The Panelist

- Andrew Leonard

- Streetsblog

- Brad Setser

- Michael Mandel

- Financial Crookery

- Kash Mansori

- Dean Baker

- Calculated Risk

- Free Exchange

- Curbed

- Lance Knobel

- Econospeak

- Carbon Tax Center

- Overcoming Bias

- Mark Thoma

- Naked Capitalism

- Alphaville

- Barry Ritholtz

- Alexander Campbell

- The Bayesian Heresy

- Brad DeLong

- DealBook

- Greg Mankiw

- Deal Journal

- FP Passport

- Carl Bialik

- Marginal Revolution

- A Fistful of Euros

- Dan Gross

When is a Hedge Not a Hedge?
Allison Pyburn has some numbers on just how much the notorious "super-senior" tranches of subprime-backed CDOs are actually worth in the market. It's probably no surprise that the junior tranches are changing hands in "the high single digits," but more to the point the super-senior tranches, she says, are fetching no more than 60 cents on the dollar, which of course corresponds to a 40% write-down. By contrast, she says, Merrill's latest write-down was just 19% on its super-senior CDO holdings.
These numbers are scary enough that there's a serious chance of a domino effect. Banks for instance were able to hedge their CDO holdings by insuring them against loss – but now the insurers are at risk of going bust. The titles of two blog entries on this subject say it all: "So Much For Being Hedged" and "Another word for hedged… leveraged".
We've already seen something along these lines at Morgan Stanley, where the "hedge" on its bearish mortgage-bond bet seems to have been much riskier than the original bet itself. But I have to say that the Morgan Stanley losses don't make a lot of sense to me. For all the talk of "negative convexity", the trade looks as though it was after all a simple long-senior, short-junior play. If you really wanted to make a bearish bet on mortgage bonds, why on earth would you fund it with a long position in mortgage bonds, of all things? Why not use emerging-market debt, or Treasury bonds, or something – anything – which wouldn't go down when mortgage debt fell in value?






