Recent Blog Posts
-
The Times' Rorshach Geithner Story
Apr 27 20099:04am EDT -
Sinking Animal Spirits
Apr 27 20098:04am EDT -
Counter-cyclical Urban Policy
Apr 26 200910:04am EDT -
Be Your Own Counterfeiter
Apr 26 20099:04am EDT -
Being Tim Geithner
Apr 25 200912:04pm EDT -
Notes From a Press Conference Naif
Apr 25 20099:04am EDT -
What Good is the News?
Apr 25 20098:04am EDT -
Stressful Enough
Apr 24 20092:04pm EDT -
Not Regretting the Pound
Apr 24 20091:04pm EDT -
Introducing the New Ford Squeeze
Apr 24 20099:04am EDT -
Non-Economic Questions of the Day
Apr 24 20099:04am EDT -
The Stress Test Blind Alley
Apr 24 20098:04am EDT -
Happy Hour
Apr 23 20099:04pm EDT -
Recovery Without Rebalancing
Apr 23 20096:04pm EDT -
The Shape of Your Recession
Apr 23 20095:04pm EDT
Links
- Felix Salmon

- DealBreaker

- Ryan Avent: The Bellows

- The Epicurean Dealmaker

- Chris Anderson

- Ultimi Barbarorum

- MarketBeat

- Michelle Leder

- John Quiggin

- The Panelist

- Andrew Leonard

- Streetsblog

- Brad Setser

- Michael Mandel

- Financial Crookery

- Kash Mansori

- Dean Baker

- Calculated Risk

- Free Exchange

- Curbed

- Lance Knobel

- Econospeak

- Carbon Tax Center

- Overcoming Bias

- Mark Thoma

- Naked Capitalism

- Alphaville

- Barry Ritholtz

- Alexander Campbell

- The Bayesian Heresy

- Brad DeLong

- DealBook

- Greg Mankiw

- Deal Journal

- FP Passport

- Carl Bialik

- Marginal Revolution

- A Fistful of Euros

- Dan Gross

Will Venezuela Really Default on its Bonds?
One of the more amusing episodes over the past few days in the world of emerging-markets debt has been the storm in a teacup over the pledge by Venezuela's Hugo Chavez to withdraw from the International Monetary Fund. Christian Oliver has a decent overview in the Washington Post today, although you can take his hyperbole about Chavez triggering "a massive debt default" with a pinch of salt.
In reality, the situation is this: if Chavez withdraws from the IMF, he breaches a covenant in most of his global bonds. In turn that puts the bonds into technical default, which means that bondholders, if they want to, can get together to try to "accelerate" the bonds and make them due and payable, at par, immediately. I'm almost certain that Venezuelan withdrawal from the IMF would not constitute a "credit event" for the purposes of the credit default swap market.
What's more, bondholders are very unlikely to want to force Venezuela to pay back its bonds at par, seeing as how most of those bonds are trading well above par. One blogger does note that there are three bonds outstanding which trade below par, and that those bonds have a face value of $4.5 billion. But even in that case the chances of acceleration are slim. Venezuela is not going to unilaterally withdraw from the IMF tomorrow: chances are it will find some kind of legal workaround which allows it to declare that it has withdrawn without triggering the covenants on its bonds.






