Congressional Democrats and the White House are nearing a deal to rescue Detroit, and the plan appears to be using the template of the bailout of financial institutions.

In exchange for $15 billion in emergency loans to General Motors and Chrysler (Ford Motor has said thanks, but no thanks), the government would get warrants for stock equivalent to 20 percent of the loans. As a result, the Treasury Department would end up as G.M.'s largest shareholder, with a 40 percent stake.

Like the rescue of American International Group, for example, the auto bailout is a halfhearted nationalization. Does the same model for very different businesses make sense? The reason financial institutions got into trouble was relying too much on imagination and taking on too much risk. The automakers have shown no imagination and have been playing it safe even as the business was falling apart for far too long. Washington has not shown it can be an effective overseer of corporate management. The Europeans, with a longer and richer history of nationalized state businesses, can claim a mixed record at best. Congress is again rushing to pass a financial fix that may be the least painful alternative, but is one that is sorely lacking in vision.

The auto rescue may also have a car czar overseeing the loans to the automakers, instead of a TARP-like committee. Jack Welch, the former General Electric chief executive, and Kenneth Feinberg, who oversaw the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund, are among the names being floated for the post. But the czar will be a compromise between the White House and President-elect Barack Obama.

The proposal sets a March 31 deadline for the auto companies receiving loans to have detailed overhaul plans in place.

Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism says this pussyfooting around the idea of nationalization is ridiculous. She writes:

"So we would rather pander to the bankrupt ideology that helped create this mess, let the perps continue to get undeserved princely pay, and stick the hapless sop taxpayer with the guaranteed-to-be-rotten fruit of this exercise rather than demonstrate leadership and reframe the issues. The hesitation to demand even modest quid pro quo is beyond belief. No private-sector negotiator would ever accept such a deal."