Russia's conflict with Georgia has sparked worries over the small country's ability to provide a secure energy transit route for the West.

Georgia contends that Russia targeted the 3-year-old Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and a Wall Street Journal reporter saw large bomb craters in a plain near the pipeline. (Russia has denied targeting it.) The B.T.C. pipeline, operated by BP, was the first to bring Caspian oil to market while bypassing Russia. It carries 850,000 barrels of oil a day, or about 1 percent of the world's crude oil supply, from Azerbaijan through Georgia and Turkey.

Portfolio.com asked Kent Moors of Duquesne University, who is also an energy and risk-management consultant specializing in the Caspian region, about the prospects of a more aggressive Russia on global energy markets.

Why haven't oil prices moved higher after the attacks?

There are a couple of reasons. Increasing demand from many parts of the world is beginning to temper. That combined with the fact that the B.T.C. was already down meant that the market was pretty well insulated from any great concern—provided the conflict is limited. If it continues or if it spreads into other areas of the Caucuses, then it's a completely new ballgame.

What other regions are at risk?

We have a situation that is developing off of the Sea of Azov, which is a water buffer between Russia and Ukraine. It remains to be seen who actually controls the development of offshore crude oil and natural gas in the Sea of Azov. We may have a difficulty there.

To the extent that the Russians gain greater hold of Abkhazia (a separatist territory in Georgia), there is some early indication that there might be some medium-sized crude and natural-gas deposits in the Black Sea off of the Abkhazian coast.

Abkhazia almost two years ago argued that they wanted Russian oil companies to develop it, and, of course, Georgia said absolutely not. Now it's a situation where Russia may lobby quite energetically to be able to develop those deposits. So that's another area where people have to be somewhat concerned because of the animosity between Russia and the Ukraine.

The other issue is that Russian operating companies—we're talking about Lukoil, Gazprom, and to a lesser extent, Rosneft—have been moving into Turkmenistan and into Uzbekistan. So now we're talking about the eastern portion of the Caspian. Plus, the Russians may be close to an agreement in principle with the Iranians on mutual development and pricing of natural gas.

And I think that's the overall strategy here. It isn't so much about acquiring territory or expanding an empire. It's about being able to control the throughput of oil and natural gas.

What impact will this have on Western Europe, which gets 40 percent of its natural gas from Russia?

After the B.T.C. was built, the Russians knew that pipelines could be built bypassing them, so they have been particularly careful to honor all contracts. One of the deputy C.E.O.'s of Russia's Gazprom said recently that the Russians are as dependent upon the Europeans as customers as the Europeans are dependent upon the Russians as a source, and I think that's basically true.

The Russians also are never going to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty like Europe wants them to do. (The treaty would allow foreign access to pipelines within Russia.) The Europeans are still holding out on this, but their leverage is being minimized because they need the natural gas.

Where does the U.S. stand in all of this?

The U.S. is being marginalized. We're still the 1,200-pound gorilla, so you can't just ignore our interests. But despite the fact that we're just 5 percent of the population and consume about 29 percent of the energy in the world, that doesn't have the same clout as it used to. The primary increased demand worldwide is coming from developing countries like China and India, and also from genuinely developing countries like those in Africa. B.T.C. is our only success in the region to try to bypass Russia, and that's not likely to be duplicated in the near future. People have seen this coming for years, and we've done virtually nothing to negotiate with Russia.

And what of foreign investment?

Putting it crassly: There's money to be made here. And unless you get to a situation in which you have a genuine concern that military ventures are going to offset domestic opportunities in Russia, it has minimal effect. Foreign investment should remain strong.