As the financial devastation caused by the mortgage banking crisis rolls through the economy, it's clear that the debacle in fundamental ways is reenacting earlier disasters:

The drive for profits caused the industry to ignore or hide profound dangers, and led regulators to look the other way, while the full consequences weren't anticipated as the crisis began.

In one respect, though, this disaster differs from every other big financial crisis, at least as far back as the 1929 market crash: No one is calling for an independent, blue-ribbon commission to investigate the causes, and to recommend ways to prevent such meltdowns from happening again.

Neither the White House nor Congress has made any move to establish such a commission. Instead, the consensus so far is to leave investigations and solutions to the regulatory agencies, lawmakers, and other political figures—among those who'd stood by even when the potential for disaster had become clear.

But in some circles in the academic and securities world, talk is growing that such a commission may be essential. They say only an independent panel would be able to conduct an aggressive, impartial investigation, provide a comprehensive narrative of what happened, and bring forth evidence of hidden fraud and false disclosure.

Such a panel, of course, could also produce conclusions and recommendations that might threaten the reputations and entrenched interests of federal regulators and the banking industry.

Robert Litan, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, an expert on banking and financial regulation, says he is writing a paper specifically calling for an investigative commission. Such a panel is needed, he argues, because some causes remain unclear, and "the solutions are not obvious and not easy."

Among unresolved questions are why banks themselves didn't recognize the danger they faced, why regulators didn't raise red flags and crack down before it was too late, and whether fundamental changes are needed in accounting rules.

Just two days after the October 1987 market crash, President Ronald Reagan established the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms to figure out what had happened.

Led by Nicholas F. Brady, who was later Treasury secretary under President George H.W. Bush, that body revealed previously unsuspected causes of the crash and suggested specific reforms. It produced fundamental changes in market trading.

Other blue-ribbon panels produced similar or even greater results:

• After the 1929 crash, the Pecora Commission made withering conclusions about bankers and the regulatory system. Its recommendations fundamentally shaped the U.S. banking system and markets for decades.


• After waves of scandals wracked trading in over-the-counter stocks and the American Stock Exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1961 appointed a commission led by Milton Cohen, a lawyer and securities authority who had been one of the S.E.C.'s first officials when the agency was created. Its report voluminous report caused radical reforms, including for the first time imposing registration and disclosure requirements for O.T.C. companies.


• After the 1980s savings-and-loan crisis, Congress established the National Commission on Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement. Its report heavily faulted S&L regulatory agencies for having helped cause the crisis, and recommended significant accounting changes.

Other panels, of course, have been formed after nonfinancial crises, including the commission that reviewed the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. They also have been lauded for fact-finding and recommendations that likely wouldn't have been possible otherwise.

Why no move by Congress to establish a panel? A spokesman for Barney Frank, the Massachusetts Democrat and chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, says this time around there's no need for an independent commission.

"We're way beyond it," he said. "We know what's happened."

Frank's spokesman contends the crisis was mainly caused by seven years of a Republican Congress and a Republican president, which opposed heightened regulation of the financial industry.

Frank and fellow Democrats already have responded with the legislation needed to address what they contend are inadequacies in government oversight and laxness by lenders.

President Bush has concentrated on stimulating the economy and bringing relief to homeowners facing foreclosure. Publicly, there hasn't been any talk of establishing a commission. The White House has been notably averse to steps that might lead to more regulation of business—or cast blame on administration appointees.

Elliot Levitas, a former Democratic congressman who also had served on the S&L commission in the 1990s, says "there's going to have to be a respected, independent blue-ribbon commission to sort out what happened" in the mortgage market. Independence is key, he said, because the regulators now trying to clean up the mess had been "asleep a the switch."

"There are people in the private sector who were so blinded and driven by greed that they were doing irresponsible things," Levitas added, "and there was nobody in an official position blowing the whistle and reining them in."

In interviews, figures such as Lynn Turner, former S.E.C. chief economist, and Harvey Goldschmid, former Democratic member of the commission, have endorsed the creation of an independent panel.

But Andrew Brimmer, a former member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors who was a co-chairman of the S&L commission, suggests one reason the time isn't ripe for a blue-ribbon panel: The mortgage crisis is still having escalating repercussions.

Brimmer says the need is for urgent, immediate steps to halt a potential economic meltdown. A panel to do a postmortem can wait, he argues, until the final tally of damage is known.