Unbeknownst to Boeing, one important supplier was being pared down by a prominent private equity firm. Vought Aircraft Industries Inc. was supposed to build the two aft barrels of the fuselage in a new factory in Charleston, South Carolina. Once completed, these parts were to be sent next door to another new factory—a joint venture between Vought and Alenia Aeronautica—to be connected to fuselage sections, wiring boxes, and the main landing gear.

But Boeing didn’t realize that the Carlyle Group, which had acquired Vought in 2000, was starving it of resources while making a few cosmetic improvements to attract potential buyers—a once-common private equity tactic. By early 2006, Vought was facing a severe “liquidity crisis” and nearly went bankrupt, chief executive Elmer Doty told analysts. It couldn’t afford the new plants, employee training, and fuselage design and assembly and had to “reconstitute” its engineering department. “We are among the riskiest, if not the riskiest” of the Dreamliner suppliers, Doty acknowledged.

When Vought sent empty fuselage barrels that were short of vital fasteners, Boeing finally took notice. The company compelled Vought to fire the executive in charge of operations in Charleston and then acquired Vought’s 50 percent stake in the joint venture with Alenia. After having spent almost $300 million on the Dreamliner project in 2008, Vought had to borrow $200 million more last year, when it finally shipped the first of its fully completed fuselage sets. Vought has asked Boeing to redraw its contract to cover more up-front expenses. So have other hard-pressed suppliers, potentially costing Boeing hundreds of millions of dollars.

McNerney says Boeing has learned from its mistakes and now monitors suppliers closely. Hundreds of Boeing employees were dispatched to suppliers to implement the “Boeing way,” and McNerney has visited many of the factories, sometimes unannounced. “We overwhelmed the suppliers with Boeing folks in reaction to not having enough early on,” he says.

Across from the Dreamliner’s placid bunker, on the opposite side of the vast barnlike plant, Boeing’s storied past and manufacturing prowess are impressively on display. A platoon of 777s is under construction on a production line superior to any other in the aerospace industry—one Boeing decided not to use for the Dreamliner because outsourcing was cheaper. Rather than assembling 777s one by one, parked side by side—the traditional approach for jet builders—Boeing has coupled its famed wide-body to a continuously moving platform that creeps along at a scarcely noticeable 1.8 inches per minute.

As the plane’s hull enters a sector, hundreds of workers standing on hoists and derricks rivet, screw, or snap into place components, wiring bundles, engine parts, and instrumentation.

Boeing does its utmost to avoid assembly delays of even a few minutes. Boeing workers monitor each 777’s exact coordinates on the factory floor from the time the jet ambles in from the plant’s rear gate, with just its aft fuselage joined to its main body, to the time it reaches the 300-foot-wide hangar doors as a completed plane.

Boeing consistently makes about seven “triple sevens” a month and boasts a backlog of about 350 orders for the $250 million plane. In the first two months of this year, the 777 had a net gain of three orders while the Dreamliner lost 32.

The moving assembly line in the 777 plant in Everett—and another in Renton, Washington, where the 737 is built—has produced impressive results that the Dreamliner program can only, well, dream about. Assembly time is down 21 percent, time spent in the factory has been reduced from 26 days to 17, and 20 percent of mistakes have been eliminated. By these measures, Boeing is at least four years ahead of Airbus.

Despite Boeing’s recent failures, its innovative spirit—reflected in the 777 and in the Dreamliner’s design—remains praise­worthy. If the economy rebounds by the time the Dreamliner makes its first commercial flight next year, the plane could still become the blockbuster Boeing envisioned. But so far, it’s just a cautionary tale. “The lesson is that manufacturing programs cannot operate as islands,” McNerney says, but must meet companywide standards. “I think we are centered on that now,” he notes ruefully. “A little later than we needed to be for the 787.”